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Since the eurozone sovereign debt crisis 
erupted, the European Union has been 
labouring to make its Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) sustainable. The resulting reforms 
have increased the powers of the EU in various 
fields of economic policymaking (six-pack, 
European Stability Mechanism, Banking Union, 
etc.). This surge in EU powers requires strong 
democratic control at the European level. 
Herman Van Rompuy, European Council 
President, was right to see 'democratic 
legitimacy and accountability' as one of the key 
pillars of EMU reforms.  
Other EU leaders have joined the European 
Council President in calling for the 
improvement of the EU’s legitimacy. The rise of 
Eurosceptic parties in the 2014 European 
elections has further underscored the fact that a 
substantial percentage of Europeans are uneasy 
with the EU’s present working methods. Hence 
it is only normal that citizens expect the EU to 
take measures intended to enhance its 
democratic legitimacy. Despite these 
expectations, concrete proposals on how to 
achieve better legitimacy remain scarce. 
One of the more concrete ideas that have been 
floated is the introduction of parliamentary 
activity that is specific to the eurozone. This 
could take the form of a eurozone-specific 
subcommittee in the European Parliament 
(which would report to the regular economic 
affairs committee, hence the term 
subcommittee). In theory, a eurozone-specific 
parliamentary body could deal with legislative 
matters, exercise scrutiny of other European 
institutions and play a role in the EU’s economic 
governance. 
The legal and political hurdles discussed below 
make the creation of a eurozone-specific 
The task of ensuring the democratic 
legitimacy of the euro has been placed 
high on the agenda. A eurozone 
subcommittee in the European 
Parliament is one of the rare concrete 
proposals to secure this, creating high 
hopes. Due to legal and political 
hurdles the idea might nonetheless have 
minimal results, which might result in 
suboptimal parliamentary scrutiny of 
the eurozone. This Policy Brief argues 
that if a eurozone subcommittee is to be 
both meaningful and politically feasible, 
it should combine substantial 
competences with innovative decision-
making. 
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parliamentary body with comprehensive 
responsibilities difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, 
within these limits, a eurozone subcommittee 
with sufficient added-value might be feasible. As 
a eurozone-specific body in the European 
Parliament is one of the few concrete ideas in 
circulation, it should in any case be seriously 
considered. This Policy Brief argues that a 
refusal to take steps in this direction entails 
certain dangers for the European Parliament and 
European democracy at large. 
REASONING BEHIND A EUROZONE 
SUBCOMMITTEE 
European heads of state and government 
repeatedly stress that democratic legitimacy and 
accountability should be assured at the level at 
which decisions are taken. Although this 
principle is often evoked, it is not always applied 
in practice. Most decisions concerning the 
eurozone are taken at eurozone level. Monetary 
policy is determined by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Informally, most decisions by 
Member States about the eurozone are taken at 
the Eurogroup, where only countries using the 
single currency are present. Leaders of the 
eurozone for their part meet at Euro Summits. 
No eurozone-specific body exists in the 
European Parliament. The Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) is the 
parliamentary committee that deals with EMU 
matters. Yet the ECON Committee is a 
conventional committee, in the sense that it 
makes no differentiation whatsoever between 
eurozone and non-eurozone Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs).  
To some extent, the lack of differentiation 
between EU and eurozone-level scrutiny can be 
seen as going against the very concept of 
representative democracy. In a representative 
democracy, the governed (i.e., 'the people') elect 
those who govern them. It is most peculiar to 
include UK citizens among the group of people 
that are governed by rules that concern only the 
eurozone, because the UK is neither willing nor 
obliged to join the common currency. Even so, 
MEPs from the UK carry more weight on 
eurozone decision-making than the MEPs from 
the eight smallest eurozone countries grouped 
together.1 
The introduction of eurozone-specific 
parliamentary activity is intended to address this 
discrepancy, and is far from new. Over a decade 
ago prominent politicians like former 
Commission President Jacques Delors and then 
German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka 
Fischer pleaded for a separate parliamentary 
body for the EU’s core. As the eurozone has 
become the de facto core of EU integration, new 
proposals focus on a parliamentary body for the 
eurozone. The German Glienicker Group and 
the French Eiffel Group have notably made 
related proposals. Even more importantly, 
foreign ministers of 11 Member States, and a 
French-German position paper also pleaded in 
favour of exploring eurozone-specific 
parliamentary activity. This support from 
Member States leads one to think that certain 
steps towards eurozone-specific scrutiny could 
be taken. 
SEVERAL HURDLES 
Despite the expectations that have been created, 
it remains highly doubtful that eurozone-specific 
parliamentary activity will become reality in the 
foreseeable future. Several hurdles lie in its path, 
both in legal and political terms. 
Legal hurdle No. 1: No legislative role for a 
eurozone subcommittee 
The EU Treaties stipulate that the European 
Parliament as a whole approves or amends EU 
legislation. The possibility of a subset of the 
Parliament adopting legally binding texts was 
not foreseen.2 For example, in the event of 
enhanced cooperation, all MEPs vote on 
legislative acts – including MEPs from Member 
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States that did not join the enhanced 
cooperation at stake. Similarly, MEPs from 
eurozone countries cannot decide on a 
modification of EU rules that solely apply to the 
eurozone without the input of MEPs from non-
eurozone counties. The EU Treaties would have 
to be revised in order to modify these voting 
rules. This is not a short-term prospect. 
The fact that voting on EU legislation is a 
responsibility of the European Parliament as a 
whole limits to a large extent the possibilities for 
eurozone-specific parliamentary activity. Yet 
despite not having a legislative role, a eurozone 
subcommittee could potentially still play a useful 
role through non-binding means (see infra). 
Legal hurdle No. 2: No distinction between 
MEPs? 
According to some, it is not possible to 
differentiate between MEPs from eurozone 
countries and MEPs from other Member States. 
Reference is made to the Treaties, which state 
that '[c]itizens are directly represented at Union 
level in the European Parliament.'3 MEPs are 
hence to consider the interests of all EU 
citizens, not just those of the Member State 
from which they originate. From this legal 
perspective, the creation of a eurozone 
subcommittee arguably does not make much 
sense. 
Another legal argument used to plead against a 
distinction between MEPs is more general in 
nature. The Treaties prohibit discrimination 
against EU citizens on grounds of nationality. 
This evidently also applies to MEPs: a Belgian 
MEP cannot be treated differently to an MEP 
from Poland solely on the basis of his/her 
nationality. Yet a possible distinction between 
eurozone and non-eurozone MEPs would not 
be based on the nationality of an MEP. It would 
instead be determined on the basis of the 
Member State where he/she was elected. The 
nationality of an MEP and the Member State of 
election do not necessarily coincide – with 
former MEP Daniel Cohn-Bendit being one of 
the most prominent examples. 
The Treaty provisions mentioned above can be 
interpreted as pleading for the unity of the 
European Parliament. Yet they do not appear to 
impose a clear-cut ban on any form of 
differentiation between MEPs. This seems all 
the more clear when taking into account the fact 
that a eurozone-specific body in the European 
Parliament would not have legislative powers. 
The political hurdle 
Beyond the legal hurdles, political objections are 
at least as important. Several policymakers 
oppose the idea of having eurozone-specific 
parliamentary activity. Understandably, such 
objections come from countries that are not part 
of the eurozone. The non-eurozone countries 
that have an obligation to join the common 
currency fear that such eurozone-specific 
parliamentary activity might exclude them from 
decisions that they are bound to apply in the 
future. Opt-out countries – Denmark and the 
UK – for their part worry that such a 
subcommittee would lead to a loss of influence, 
with the UK also being concerned about a 
possible negative impact on its financial sector. 
The most important political objections actually 
come from inside the European Parliament 
itself. Several MEPs have argued against a 
distinction in parliamentary mandates. The 
major fear is that a eurozone subcommittee 
would harm the unity of the European 
Parliament. As MEP Syed Kamall puts it, a 
eurozone subcommittee would be “a case of 
divide and rule.” Others fear that an 
unambitious eurozone subcommittee would not 
be able to live up to expectations that it would 
improve the EMU’s legitimacy. 
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THE DANGERS OF LOW RESULTS 
Agreement on eurozone-specific parliamentary 
activity in the European Parliament is a decision 
that the MEPs themselves have to take. A 
proposal on the matter has been on the table in 
the Parliament, but did not lead to practical 
results. With the start of the 2014–2019 
legislative term, new initiatives on the subject lie 
on the horizon. Yet any new initiative is bound 
to face serious opposition, limiting the scope of 
any potential agreement on the matter. 
Such a low-key result could either consist of a 
eurozone subcommittee with as small a scope as 
possible, or in simply blocking the idea 
altogether. In essence, the European Parliament 
would then continue to operate as if the EU was 
still one homogenous block without deeper 
integration in the eurozone. This might provoke 
unwanted consequences. As the idea of a 
subcommittee would have minimal positive 
results, this is likely to cause disillusionment 
about the EU’s ability to improve its democratic 
legitimacy. 
Furthermore, if Member States are not satisfied 
with the way eurozone-specific scrutiny is 
organized at the European Parliament, they 
might seek other venues for improving the 
EMU’s democratic legitimacy. In that case, an 
inter-parliamentary assembly of national 
parliamentarians (perhaps including some 
MEPs) is the obvious alternative. In fact, such 
an assembly already exists in the form of the 
Inter-parliamentary Conference on Economic 
Governance. If such an assembly were to be 
endowed with eurozone-specific competences, 
these competences would at first be limited. Yet 
when a future revision of the Treaties occurs, 
the inter-parliamentary assembly might have 
become the obvious body to be entrusted with 
more far-reaching eurozone-specific 
competences. Parliamentary scrutiny would then 
shift away from the European Parliament 
towards a more national-based approach. 
Such a national-based framework for democratic 
control would go against the long evolution 
towards control at the European level, 
transcending the individual national interests. 
More national scrutiny of the EU is of course to 
be applauded, but it should not come at the 
expense of the role of the European Parliament. 
Yet by resisting the creation of a eurozone 
subcommittee in order to maintain 'unity' in the 
Parliament, the institution could actually be 
preparing the grounds for a move in the 
opposite direction. As Renaud Dehousse puts it 
'[b]y insisting on an idealized vision of a European 
people in the making, [the European Parliament] will 
provide fodder to those who argue it should be confined to 
purely symbolic functions.' The rejection of a 
substantive eurozone subcommittee might thus 
prove to be a long-term defeat for the European 
Parliament, disguised as a short-term victory. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL 
EUROZONE SUBCOMMITTEE 
In light of these dangers, the European 
Parliament would be wise to show openness 
towards organizing eurozone-specific 
parliamentary scrutiny. At the same time, if a 
decision to create a eurozone subcommittee is 
made, it needs to transcend a minimalistic 
compromise. A subcommittee with genuine 
added-value would need to combine substantial 
competences and original decision-making. 
Substantial competences 
In terms of competences, the subcommittee 
should cover all the areas of closer economic 
integration that have emerged in the EU. The 
following six aspects of the EMU would ideally 
be dealt with inside the subcommittee: 
 Eurozone aspects of economic policy 
coordination: this includes the eurozone-
specific recommendations issued during the 
European Semester, as well as the draft 
budgetary plans of eurozone countries. 
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 Sanctions during the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and the Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure. 
 Banking Union, including hearings and 
confidential discussions with EU officials. 
 European Stability Mechanism (ESM): 
monitoring financial assistance programmes 
and the overall functioning of the ESM. 
 Monetary dialogue, notably the hearing of the 
President of the ECB. 
 Fiscal Compact: its implementation and 
application, as well the potential integration 
into EU law. 
While these six areas cover a broad range of 
EMU-related matters, it should be clear that the 
European Parliament’s role in these areas is 
often limited. It has little to say in the European 
Semester, for example, while the ESM-treaty 
simply does not provide a role of scrutiny for 
the Parliament. Yet the non-existence of a 
eurozone subcommittee might be precisely one 
of the reasons why the European Parliament has 
not been endowed with a greater role in these 
matters. By creating a eurozone subcommittee, 
the European Parliament would signal that it is 
capable of adapting to the closer integration that 
is taking place among some of the EU’s 
Member States. 
Furthermore, the potential creation of a 
eurozone subcommittee could be used as 
leverage by the European Parliament to acquire 
additional scrutiny powers. As the push for 
eurozone-specific parliamentary activity 
essentially stems from national governments, 
this puts the European Parliament in an 
advantageous position to negotiate with the 
Member States on stronger parliamentary 
control in return for the creation of the 
subcommittee. 
With regard to the areas of closer integration 
mentioned above, it is important to highlight 
that they are not always limited to the eurozone: 
the Banking Union will most likely comprise 
eurozone and non-eurozone members, while the 
Fiscal Compact was signed by 25 Member 
States. In order to highlight the fact that the 
subcommittee is not solely dealing with 
eurozone matters, it could be dubbed the 'Euro 
Area Plus Subcommittee' (although this wording 
would link it to the unsuccessful Euro Plus Pact 
that was signed in 2011). 
If a subset of EU Member States decides on 
additional closer economic integration in the 
future, this could then be added to the tasks of 
the subcommittee. Important potential additions 
include contractual arrangements on structural 
reforms between the EU and the Member 
States, as well as a eurozone budget. The latter 
in particular would be a game-changer, as it 
could give the eurozone responsibilities in terms 
of taxation. 
Innovative decision-making 
The scope of competences is not the only factor 
to be taken into account to evaluate the 
eurozone subcommittee’s design. A compromise 
on the subcommittee should also transcend the 
lowest common denominator in terms of 
decision-making (i.e., no differentiation 
whatsoever between MEPs). In this sense, the 
design of the eurozone subcommittee should 
adhere to two guiding principles. 
Openness in decision-shaping is the first important 
principle. MEPs from all Member States should 
be able to participate in the work and 
deliberations of the subcommittee. In this way 
non-eurozone MEPs are not excluded and the 
perception of backroom decisions is avoided. 
Differentiation in decision-taking should apply as a 
second principle. In terms of voting, a 
distinction should be made between MEPs that 
were elected in Member States that participate in 
the specific closer economic integration (e.g., 
eurozone, Banking Union) and MEPs from 
other Member States. For a decision to be 
adopted by the subcommittee, it would need to 
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have at least a majority among MEPs from the 
Member States participating in the closer 
integration.4  
While the idea of differentiation in decision-
taking is undoubtedly contentious, it is an even 
more vital condition for giving the 
subcommittee the necessary added-value. 
Importantly, non-eurozone MEPs should bear 
in mind the fact that the subcommittee’s 
decisions would in no way commit Member 
States that at this point do not participate in the 
relevant closer economic integration. 
CONCLUSION 
A eurozone subcommittee in the European 
Parliament will not undo the EU’s perceived 
lack of legitimacy. Nonetheless, with the proper 
design in place, a eurozone subcommittee could 
be a step in the right direction. It would allow 
the European Parliament to adapt to the new 
reality of a Europe with different layers of 
integration. 
In order for a eurozone subcommittee to be 
worthwhile, it needs to be original in its 
functioning. Merely replicating the ECON 
committee’s organization – minus some powers – 
will not do. If the decision is made to create a 
eurozone subcommittee, the latter should have 
(i) substantive competences and should (ii) 
combine openness in decision-shaping with 
differentiation when taking decisions. The key 
concerns of non-eurozone countries should be 
alleviated by the openness and non-legislative 
role of the eurozone subcommittee. 
Understandably, it would not be easy for the 
European Parliament to establish a eurozone 
subcommittee with the characteristics that were 
discussed in this Policy Brief. Yet such a 
eurozone subcommittee crucially offers a rare 
chance to strengthen the democratic scrutiny of 
the EMU. Furthermore, MEPs need to consider 
the potential consequence of not having a 
eurozone subcommittee: a drive towards 
national-based parliamentary scrutiny of the 
eurozone. In order to defend the European 
ideal, the European Parliament will have to be 
pragmatic. 
Stijn Verhelst is Senior Research Fellow at 
Egmont – Royal Institute for International 
Relations. 
 
ENDNOTES 
1 In the 2014–2019 Parliament, the UK has 73 MEPs. Together, the smallest eight eurozone countries only have 64 MEPs. 
A counterargument to this logic is that a country like Austria also has the right to vote on fisheries, despite being a 
landlocked country. Whether the counterargument is fully valid is questionable: Austria pays into the fisheries funding and 
consumes fishery products – justifying a say on the matter. Furthermore, decisions about economic policy are arguably of 
a qualitatively different nature, illustrated by the fact that informal decisions in the Council are taken at the eurozone level. 
2 See Part Six of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). 
3 Article 10(2) Treaty on European Union (TEU). In a similar vein, Article 14(2) TEU states that 'The European 
Parliament shall be composed of representatives of the Union’s citizens'. 
4 This distinction is used, for example, in the case of the Schengen Agreement, where non-EU Member States participate 
in decision-shaping, but not in decision-taking. See Blanchet, Thérèse (2013) Justice and Home Affairs: A Laboratory for 
Differentiation. In Lepoivre, M. and Verhelst, S. (eds.) Variable geometry union: How differentiated integration is shaping 
the EU. Studia Diplomatica Vol. LXVI, Issue 3. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont 
Institute. Founded in 1947, EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think 
tank dedicated to interdisciplinary research.  
www.egmontinstitute.be 
 
© Egmont Institute 2014. All rights reserved. 
 
Royal Institute 
for International Relations 
